Introduction
Since 1945, international criminal justice has been one continuous construction site, an expression of the attitude of international stakeholders and policy-makers that favours temporary solutions to contemporary problems. Even with the creation of the ICC that has not really changed. The history of international criminal procedure until the advent of the ICC has substantially been one of cobbling together building blocks from different traditions in order to create a new sui generis system based on extrapolations from Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ and the history of Nuremberg, Tokyo and the other post-war military tribunals. This eclectic approach has unfortunately been combined with a plethora of regulatory lacunae left to the judges of the tribunals by the international (for want of a better word:) law-making bodies, a criticism that applies to the ICC as well, albeit clearly to a lesser degree. The 'sui generis' system seems nonetheless to have had mainly adversarial overtones.
1 Even in cases where the statute of a tribunal, such as the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), provides for the adaptation of a civil law model, 2 the court's judges in their rule-making power have, as will be shown below, blindsided the drafters of the Statute and introduced a way for the court to revert to what is in essence an adversarial model. Interesting as the developments in international criminal law may appear if viewed as a 'legal laboratory", the fact remains that courts, which deal with putting people away for many years for horrendous crimes, must first of all strive for legal certainty. move to a system is necessary which protects the defence and keeps the prosecution in check by, among other things, ensuring sanctions for premature assurances 3 of trial-readiness -an issue brought into sharp relief at the STL in the controversy about joining the case of a fifth accused at the eleventh hour to that of the four fist accused when the trial was weeks away, when their case had been developing for far over a year and the identity of the fifth accused had been known all along as well.
The temporary nature of the present system which mainly uses adversarial models is based to a large extent on an unprincipled reliance on supposedly "ready-made" and "tried and tested"
solutions from as well as the experience of staff employed at previous tribunals. The use of the adversarial model is thus not based on a principled evaluation of its usefulness and effectiveness in the international context but on a default attitude of the lawyers creating and populating international tribunals, and possibly the diplomatic community in the wider sense. As will be shown at the example of the Lebanon Tribunal, sometimes the opposing intentions of the drafters of a Statute are undermined by adversarially-minded judges. The author does not advance the suggestion that the adversarial model as such lacks capacity for permanence, and if the international justice system had used the inquisitorial approach in the same manner as it has the adversarial one, the same comments would apply mutatis mutandis. Yet, as things stand at the moment, the temporary quality is factually tied to the adversarial model.
A case in point -the STL
To clarify the point made about the STL and temporariness, it bears remembering that this tribunal was not meant to address international offences such as war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide, but a simple if major terrorist attack in Lebanon and that it should apply substantive Lebanese law. The international involvement was merely due to the inability of the questions of witnesses in that they have to be made through the presiding judge. The CPP is available on the STL's website and, indeed, one of the Lebanese appellate judges was responsible for its publication at the time the CPP was passed. Rule 145(B) then takes the bold step to say that if the case file is not sufficient for the judges to proceed as under Article 20(2), the chamber may revert to adversarial mode. In other words, if the file does not provide a sound basis to the standard required to follow the procedure as foreseen in the hiearchically superior Statute, another procedure can be followed which divests the trial chamber of the control of the presentation of the evidence and shifts control to the prosecution. This is in substance nothing else but allowing the prosecution -via the pre-trial judge -to declare trial readiness when it is in fact not ready, because if it were, then the file would contain all the material the trial chamber would need to proceed as ordered by Article 20(2). How this can be in the interests of justice is unclear, to say the least. It might in extreme cases also mean that even though the case file was as complete as possible at the time, the judges could revert to adversarial mode if none of them was comfortable with or experienced in running 6 Emphasis added.
5
a pro-actively judge-led trial.
7 Given the systemic or professional provenance of many international judges in general that would not seem to be an unreasonable inference.
In Maybe because the first President in charge of the STL had already had the experience of drafting a set of RPE at another international tribunal and it seemed less burdensome to adapt these to the STL's environment -with the innovation of a separate pre-trial (but not investigating) judge already having been secured in the Statute? But then the one major controversial item in the STL and CPP arsenal of procedural tools from a human rights standards 7 In this context, it is not uncommon to hear the question "How does this affect justice?". This question seems to proceed from an undefined and almost nebulously philosophical idea of justice that is distinct and uncoupled from any of its real-world incarnations within a particular procedural framework and is akin to asking whether the trial would not be "fair" otherwise. The answer to that is, firstly, that, as we have accepted, both adversarial and inquisitorial models can achieve comparable levels of fairness but as we shall argue, they do not reach the same degree of efficiency. Secondly, and more to the theoretical point, it is the procedural model as set out in a statute etc. that defines the ambit of the powers of the prosecution and the judges, as well as the rights of the defence and the victims. It is dangerous to tamper with a balanced system based on whims arising from perceived individual injustices, as this tends to upset the balance and lead to inroads into a party's legal positions, and more often than not those of the defence. Finally, although positivism does no longer have a very favourable press these days when the famous Radbruch Formula about unjust law is trotted out regularly, it bears reminding oneself that to rely on a notion as abstract as that of "natural justice" for use -in an individual case -as a substantive corrective criterion to procedural rules laid down by (a written) law is at the end of the day nothing short of allowing judges to discard such laws if they deem them unfair or unwieldy, beyond the reach of the method of accepted teleological interpretation. Substance without form is arbitrariness. 
Conclusion
This brief excursion into the law of just one tribunal has hopefully shown what effects the 'draftas-you-go' approach as an expression of temporariness can entail. It opens the building of the administration of justice up to intruders with separate agendas and to political negotiations that would appear to fit and fix the temporary emergency and to fill the temporary gaps in the law needed for the fixing. A proper and detailed Code of International Criminal Procedure applicable to any and all international criminal courts and tribunals -and this author in the final analysis argues for nothing less -would mean a big step away from these constant uncertainties. After all, no-one would want to be faced with a justice system as it currently exists on the international level, were they to face trial at home even on lesser charges than genocide. In this context, the highest international justice standards must not fall below their highest national counterpartsand legal certainty is a fundamental one among their number.
